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INTRODUCTION
A final judgment marks an important milestone in the lifecycle of a court
case, but it is by no means the end of the journey. This is particularly true in the
realm of transnational litigation, where judgments rendered by the domestic
courts of one state, are likely to be recognized and enforced in one or several
other jurisdictions. Different from local judgments, which often rely on a
uniform set of rules and a straightforward enforceability regime; the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments depends on a mixture of
international agreements, the domestic law principles, public policy and public
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. The author
wishes to thank Larissa Clare Pochmann Da Silva and Jasminka Kalajdzic for their
comments and kindness in helping me locate relevant documents and other valuable
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order considerations of the nations involved.1
Moreover, because litigation does not occur in a vacuum but rather in a
context affected by social, economic, and political realities, 2 the effective
compliance with a court judgment is also influenced by a number of external
factors. As a result, the parties on each side of a dispute will typically embark
on a quest of global proportions and deploy different strategies geared to find
the most favorable jurisdiction to attain their goals. Other non-party
stakeholders including government officials, non-governmental organizations,
and members of the private sector will also play a role in influencing the
outcome of large-scale complex cases.
If one looks at today's transnational litigation landscape, there is hardly a
better example than the case between a group of indigenous peoples from
Ecuador and the Chevron Corporation to showcase the intricacies that surround
the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. This case, commonly
known as the Lago Agrio litigation, is named after the Ecuadorean oil field
where the activities that led to the judicial battle between the parties took
place. 3 As it currently stands, the centerpiece of the Lago Agrio litigation is an
$18.2 billion judgment issued on February 14, 2011, against Chevron by the
Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios in Ecuador. 4 At the time of writing,
plaintiffs have sought the recognition and enforcement of this judgment in at
least three jurisdictions outside of Ecuador; namely, Argentina, 5 Brazil,6 and
Canada.7 At the time of writing, only the courts of Argentina 8 and Canada9
have issued rulings denying the enforcement requests, and Brazilian courts will
render their decision any day. Plaintiffs, however, have continued to fight and
1. See generally RalfMichaels, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments,
in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rfidiger Wolfrum, ed.,
2009).
2. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO & MANUEL A. GOMEZ,
Litigation and Dispute Resolution, in LAW IN MANY SOCIETIES 173 (2011).
3. See William Langewiesche, Jungle Law, VANITY FAIR, May 2007,
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/05/texaco2007O5.
4. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002-2003 (Super. Ct. ofNueva Loja, Feb. 14,
2011) (Ecuador) [hereinafter "Lago Agrio Judgment"].
5. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., File 91,814 (Nat. Ct. Spec. Civ. and Com., Jan. 23,
2013) (Argentina).
6. See Application for Recognition of Foreign Judgment, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp.,
S.T.J., Pet. 8542, Relator: Min. Andrighi (Sup. Trib. Justice, June 27, 2012).
7. See Application for the Recognition of Foreign Judgment, Yaiguaje v. Chevron
Corp., No. CV-12-454778 (Sup. Ct. Ont., May 31, 2012) (Canada).
8. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., File 91,814 (Sup. Ct. June 4, 2013) (Argentina)
[hereinafter "Argentine Supreme Court Ruling"].
9. See Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., 2013 ONSC 2527 (Sup. Ct. Ont., May 1, 2013)
(Canada) [hereinafter "Ontario Superior Court Ruling"].
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will likely expand their enforcement efforts to other jurisdictions. 10
Chevron, on the other hand, has deployed a multi-prong preemptive
strategy to thwart plaintiffs' attempt to materialize the Ecuadorean court ruling.
Chevron is not only defending itself aggressively in the recognition and
enforcement actions, but it has also launched several parallel proceedings in the
United States and elsewhere to gain leverage. These include the utilization of
international arbitral proceedings pursuant a bilateral investment treaty between
Ecuador and the United States, 1 1 several collateral injunctions and other
ancillary proceedings, 12 and even a civil racketeering action based on a
fraudulent scheme allegedly concocted on plaintiffs' behalf. 13 Furthermore,
both parties have utilized several of out-of-court tactics that include the filing
of administrative complaints, 14 diplomatic and political pressure in the United
States and abroad, and a phenomenal media campaign that the parties have
used to respond to each other and to engage with the public via frequent press
releases or web postings.1 5 By looking at the parties' constant effort to
10. The ongoing nature of the litigation makes this Article timely but also poses a few
challenges. First, it has made it particularly difficult to obtain foreign court files and other
relevant documents, and to elicit information from the parties and others stakeholders.
Second, the notoriety of this case and the vast media coverage given to it also makes it
harder to distinguish facts from media speculation, or from the parties' prejudiced portrayal
of the case. Notwithstanding, most of these obstacles have been overcome, and the data
relied upon to write this Article is the most currently available to date. Although this Article
only focuses on the few jurisdictions where the parties are currently litigating, because of the
high stakes involved and the worldwide exposure of Chevron's assets in more than seventy
countries it is likely that more jurisdictions will become involved in the near future.
11. See generally Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL
Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/257.
12. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2012); In re
Chevron Corp., No. 11 cv 24599 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 2012); Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger,
629 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2011); Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 cv 0691 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8,
2011); In re Chevron Corp., 749 F. Supp. 2d 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Application of
Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Stratus
Consulting, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 00047(MSK)(MEH), 2010 WL 2135217 (D. Colo. May 25,
2010); In re Application of Chevron Corp., No. 2:10 cv 02675 SRC MAS (D.N.J. June 7,
2010); Chevron Corp. v. Allen, No. 2:10 mc 00091 WKS (D. Vt. Nov. 16, 2010).
13. See Chevron v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
14. See Unitarian Universalist Ass'n of Congregations v. Chevron Corp., Petition for
Investigation regarding Chevron's disclosure violations of its $18.1 Ecuador Judgment, May
9, 2012 (on file with author); Chevron Corp. v. Thomas P. DiNapoli, In the Matter of an
Investigation into Apparent Misconduct by New York State Comptroller Thomas P.
DiNapoli, before The New York State Joint Commission on Public Ethics (on file with
author).
15. See, e.g., CHEVRON, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (last visited July 6, 2013):
CHEVRONTOxiCo, http://chevrontoxico.com/ (last visited July 6, 2013); JUIcoCRuDO,
http://www.juiciocrudo.com (last visited July 6, 2013); THE AMAZON Post,
http://www.theamazonpost.com/ (last visited July 6, 2013); TexacoToxico,
http://www.texacotoxico.org/ (last visited July 6, 2013).
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maintain their fight in multiple fronts, one can easily characterize the Chevron-
Ecuador saga as the judicial version of a Hydra, the mythical monster with the
body of a serpent and many heads that could never be harmed, and which
severed heads would grow back endless times. 16 Like in the legend of the
Hydra, the Chevron-Ecuador case not only resists going away, but also and
seems to grow more everyday.
Litigation against Chevron by the people of Lago Agrio first commenced
in 1993, when Maria Aguinda Salazar and others filed a putative class action
lawsuit against then-Texaco in U.S federal courts.17 That action was dismissed
on forum non conveniens grounds. 18 The current litigation arose from a civil
lawsuit of collective nature filed by Aguinda and others against Chevron in
2003.19 The Ecuadorean lawsuit was an attempt by the representatives of the
indigenous peoples of the Amazon to hold the multinational energy behemoth
accountable for their actions in the region.
The lawsuit concerned a series of environmental harms arising out of the
oil-exploitation activities led by a consortium in which Texaco Petroleum
Company (TexPet) participated.20 These were part of the Napo Concession in
Northeastern Ecuador between 1964 and 1990.21 Chevron was named as a
defendant in the litigation based on its successor liability stemming from
Chevron's acquisition of all of Texaco's assets in 2001.22 The corporate entity
that resulted from the transaction became the fourth largest oil company in the
world,23 which certainly increased its power, but also its worldwide exposure.
16. JULIE STANTON, MYTHOLOGY: MYTHS, LEGENDS AND FANTASIES 128 (2006).
17. See Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Jota v. Texaco,
Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
18. See id.
19. Complaint, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002-2003 (Super. Ct. of Nueva Loja,
May 7, 2003) (Ecuador).
20. See id. at 4.
21. See id. at 4, 5.
22. Chevron, however, has vehemently denied being Texaco's successor-in-interest,
and has also challenged that any merger between the two companies took place. Among
other things, Chevron has alleged that they are a separate corporate entity fiom Texaco, and
that the only merger that occurred was between Texaco and a Chevron's subsidiary called
Keepep, Inc. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235, 243 & nn.23-25
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). In its final decision on the merits, the Nueva Loja court dismissed
Chevron's defense thus declaring that a merger between Chevron and Texaco had indeed
occurred, which under Article 17 of Ecuador's Corporations' Law (Ley de Compafiias) holds
them jointly liable. In any event, and even in the case that both Texaco and Chevron were
still separate entities, the court found it appropriate to lift their corporate veils and
considered them a single entity for purposes of the trial. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra
note 4, at 11, 15.
23. See Andrew Ross Sorkin & Neela Banerjee, Chevron Agrees to Buy Texaco For
Stock Valued at $36 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2000, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/16/business/chevron-agrees-to-buy-texaco-for-stock-
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Rather than seeking remedies for individual injuries inflicted on their own
bodies or property, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs acted as representatives of the
affected Indigenous communities with regard to their collective right to a
healthy environment. Such rights, as defined by the Environmental
Management Act of 1999,24 are indivisible and of diffuse nature. Meaning, any
remedy resulting from the litigation was supposed to benefit the community,
and not the individuals involved.
The Lago Agrio judgment is by all measures the largest and most complex
award rendered against a multinational oil company in Ecuador, and perhaps in
the entire region. With regard to its size, the type of remedies awarded to the
plaintiffs by the Sucumbios court, and the mechanisms through which those
remedies will be made effective, the enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment
has rekindled a debate on several important issues that pertain to the litigation
of complex cases in South America. 25 The Lago Agrio judgment has revealed
the complexity of the multilayered, multistep process of enforcing a foreign
judgment across different jurisdictions. In so doing, the Lago Agrio ruling has a
direct bearing on the larger debate about the judicial protection of collective
rights in Latin America, the controversial treatment of punitive damages in
countries of the civil law tradition, and the undue influence of litigants on the
performance of the courts.
It comes as no surprise that the Chevron-Ecuador saga has garnered the
worldwide attention of the media and the scholarly literature. Numerous
reports, newspaper articles and documentaries have been published around the
world since the beginnings of the case in the early nineties. Several legal
scholars have also focused on different aspects of the litigation, but mainly with
regard to the developments in the United States.26 The development of the
Chevron-Ecuador litigation in South America is one of the most important
pieces in the context of this saga and has been generally neglected from the
valued-at-36-billion.html.
24. Ley No. 37. RO/ 245 de 30 de Julio de 1999, Environmental Management Act of
1999 (Ley de Manejo Ambiental de 1999) (Ecuador) [hereinafter "EMA"].
25. For a discussion of aggregate litigation in Latin America, see Manuel A. G6mez,
Will the Birds Stay South? The Rise of Class Actions and other forms of Group Litigation
Across Latin America, 43 U. MtAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter "G6mez, Rise
of Class Actions"]; Manuel A. G6mez, Like Migratory Birds: Latin American Claimants in
U.S. Courts and the Ford-Firestone Rollover Litigation, 11 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 281
(2005).
26. See, e.g., Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Discretionary Ground
for the Non-Recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United
States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241 (2010); Sarah Joseph, Protracted Warfare: The Tale of
Chevron Texaco in the Amazon, 3 J. HUMAN RIGHTS & ENVIR. 70 (2012); Robert V. Percival,
Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L. REV. 579 (2011); Cassandra Burke
Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 159 (2011).
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consideration of academicians. This Article fills that gap.
By switching its attention away from the litigation handled by U.S. courts,
and focusing into the generally overlooked South American court cases, this
Article helps to complete the puzzle of the Chevron saga with regard to the
factors that affect the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in that
region. More specifically, this Article will discuss the interplay between the
procedural steps routinely required by the national laws of the enforcing
jurisdictions, the treaty obligations assumed by the nations involved, the
statutory defenses allowed to the parties, and the litigation strategies employed
by counsel to effectively assist or impede the judgment from being fulfilled.
The contribution of this Article is two-fold. First, it discusses with certain
level of detail the recognition and enforcement regime of foreign judgments
across Latin America with special attention to the domestic and the
international legal regimes applicable to Argentina and Brazil. Second, by
giving importance to the context within which the Lago Agrio litigation and
related proceedings are taking place, this Article addresses defendant's
strategies to evade the enforcement of an adverse judgment, and the incentives
and challenges faced by plaintiffs, including the strategies procedural and
otherwise, to obtain the recognition and enforcement of said foreign judgment.
Although the discussion offered in this Article in centered on a single case, in a
broader sense this Article highlights the practical difficulties of transnational
judgment enforcement and the strategies employed by the parties across
multiple countries.
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I highlights the contours of the
Lago Agrio litigation and delves into a discussion about the key events, the
arguments presented by the parties, and the position taken by the courts of
Ecuador at different levels. This part continues with a discussion of the
Ecuadorean proceedings on appeal and concludes with a description of
Chevron's preemptive attempt to block the enforcement of the Lago Agrio
judgment in Ecuador, the United States, and elsewhere. Part II describes the
plaintiffs' attempts to seek recognition and enforcement of the Lago Agrio
judgment in Brazil and Argentina, with special focus on the litigation strategies
employed by the parties, their direct impact on the outcome of the Lago Agrio
litigation, and the possible effect of the Chevron-Ecuador saga on the current
landscape of transnational litigation in the region.
I. FROM THE IMPROBABLE TO THE INEVITABLE: LAGO AGRIO AND BEYOND
In January of 2002, upon the final dismissal of a federal class action
lawsuit filed by Maria Aguinda Salazar and forty-seven other Ecuadorean
[Vol. 1:2
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nationals against Texaco in the Southern District of New York,27 plaintiffs set
their wheels in motion to file a new complaint in Ecuador. This time around
they targeted Chevron, which a few months earlier had completed its merger
with Texaco, thus forming the fourth largest oil provider in the world.28 Texaco
had "successfully" fought the first wave of the litigation in the United States by
persuading the courts that the case belonged in Ecuador. 29 In support of its
motion to dismiss the complaint in U.S. federal court, Chevron produced
evidence to prove that it was Ecuador, and not the U.S., that offered the best
possible conditions for the parties to the litigation. 30 As a condition for
obtaining the dismissal of the case in the U.S., then-Texaco agreed to be sued
in Ecuador, to accept service of process, and to waive any statute of limitations
defenses against the plaintiffs.3 1 Moreover, Texaco accepted to satisfy any
judgments that were issued in the plaintiffs' favor, although it also reserved its
rights to exercise any challenge set forth in the applicable instruments.
32
Once the dismissal of the U.S. action was confirmed, Texaco had every
reason to believe that the plaintiffs' case would disintegrate. A few years earlier
Texaco had reached a settlement with several municipal governments from
Ecuador and obtained an ample release for any liability arising out of Texaco's
involvement in the oil-exploiting activities led by the Consortium Operator
owner of the 1973 concession.3 3 In 1994, at least four municipalities had
brought civil lawsuits against TexPet seeking compensation for environmental
damages in connection with the same concession. All these cases were settled
in 1995.
That same year, TexPet entered into an agreement with the Ecuadorean
27. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002).
28. See In the Matter of Chevron Corp., No. C-4023, 133 F.T.C. 1 (2002).
29. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476-80.
30. Id. at 478. The Second Circuit noted:
Plaintiffs contend that Ecuadorian courts are subject to corrupt influences and are incapable
of acting impartially. After ordering supplemental briefing on this question, Judge Rakoff
made detailed findings. He found: 1) no evidence of impropriety by Texaco or any past
member of the Consortium in any prior judicial proceeding in Ecuador; 2) there are presently
pending in Ecuador's courts numerous cases against multinational corporations without any
evidence of corruption; 3) Ecuador has recently taken significant steps to further the
independence of its judiciary; 4) the State Department's general description of Ecuador's
judiciary as politicized applies primarily to cases of confrontations between the police and
political protestors; 5) numerous U.S. courts have found Ecuador adequate for the resolution
of civil disputes involving U.S. companies; and 6) because these cases will be the subject of
close public and political scrutiny, as confirmed by the Republic's involvement in the
litigation, there is little chance of undue influence being applied.... We cannot say that these
findings were an abuse of discretion.
Id.
31. Id.
32. See Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 389 (2d Cir. 2011).
33. See Agreement between the Government of Ecuador, Ecuadorian Gulf Oil
Company, and TexPet of August 6, 1973.
Spring 2013]
STANFORD JOURNAL OF COMPLEXLITIGATION
Ministry of Energy and Mines and Petroecuador for the performance of
environmental reparation works and release from obligations, liabilities and
lawsuits. 34 As part of this settlement with the Ecuadorean government Texaco
also agreed to a forty million-dollar remediation plan intended to offer full
reparation to the affected communities, and also to preclude the possibility of
any future claim to be brought against Texaco. 35 In September of 2008, the
government of Ecuador issued a final release to Texaco, thereby putting an end
to any possible reclamations arising out of the consortium activities.
36
Furthermore, even if there were still any disgruntled plaintiffs eager to sue in
Ecuador in connection with that concession, they would face practical obstacles
inherent to the Ecuadorean legal system, which made any potential litigation
highly improbable. But improbable does not mean impossible.
A. Collective Redress in the Amazon: The Lago Agrio Litigation
Despite the apparent finality conveyed by the aforementioned settlement
agreements, the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios allowed the new
lawsuit brought by Aguinda and others against Chevron to proceed. The
complaint was grounded on the then-new Environmental Management Act of
1999 (EMA),37 the passage of which Chevron would later attribute to the
lobbying efforts of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. Regardless of whether EMA was
tailor-made to be used in the Chevron dispute, the statute represented a step
forward in the protection of collective rights in Ecuador. For the first time in
the history of that country, EMA gave standing to individuals or groups linked
by a common interest and directly affected by a conduct deemed harmful to
34. See Settlement Agreement and Release among the Government of Ecuador,
PetroEcuador, Petroproducci6n, PetroComercial, and TexPet, November 17, 1005
[hereinafter "1995 Global Settlement"].
35. See Contract for Implementing of Environmental Remediation Work and Release
from Obligations, Liability, and Claims among the Government of Ecuador, PetroEcuador,
and TexPet, May 4, 1995.
36. Notwithstanding, between 1991 and 1993 Texaco filed at least seven lawsuits
against the Ecuadorean government seeking over $533 million in damages in connection
with the 1973 and 1977 agreements. The excessive delays in those cases prompted Chevron
and Texaco to commence arbitration proceedings against the Republic of Ecuador for
violation of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between Ecuador and the United States. In
August of 2011, the arbitral panel ruled for Chevron and Texaco and ordered the Republic of
Ecuador to pay $96 million, plus interests, for their breach. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Final Award (Aug. 31, 2011),
available at http://italaw.com/documents/ChevronEcuadorFinalAward.pdf.
37. See Ley de Manejo Ambiental, REGISTRO OFIciAL No. 245 (1999). Plaintiffs
referred to this law as to "90/10" Law because of a provision in its article 43, which provides
that a party found liable for damages to the environment shall be ordered to pay ten percent
of the amount of damages to the representative party. Although the law does not indicate it
expressly, some have interpreted that the remaining ninety percent would go to the victims.
[Vol. 1:2
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their health or to the environment. 38 The action permitted by EMA, however,
did not allow for personal injury claims, but only claims of collective nature
affecting an unidentifiable group or the entire community.39 Because of the
indivisibility of such community interests, any remedies obtained as a result of
the litigation would mainly benefit the group and not its representatives in their
individual capacity.
As a result, the plaintiffs would only be entitled to a fee equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of damages awarded by the court,40 which the
Sucumbios Court decided to give it to an entity other than the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs, thus arguably departing from the strict interpretation of the law.
Moreover, although a single individual or a group could bring a diffuse-right
action such as the one allowed by EMA, the outcome of the litigation would be
nonetheless binding and produce res judicata effect on the entire community
that it was intended to protect.
Although the U.S. district court that dismissed the Aguinda class action had
concluded that Ecuador was an alternative and adequate forum for this
litigation, prior to 1999, noprivate individual or group could have brought such
type of lawsuit in Ecuador. Until that time, protection of the environment and
other diffuse rights was a prerogative on the state, and only the executive
branch was able to act on behalf of the general population.
42
The fact that the harmful events attributed to Texaco took place years
earlier would later be used by Chevron to challenge the lawsuit on the basis of
the retroactive application of a law is barred under general principles of
Ecuadorean law.4 3 Other defenses presented by Chevron to seek dismissal of
38. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra note 4, at 35.
39. For a discussion on diffuse and collective rights in the Latin American context, see
supra note 25.
40. See Ley de Manejo Ambiental, REGISTRO OFICIAL No. 245 (1999).
41. When reaffirming the dismissal of the Aguinda class action on forum non
conveniens grounds, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted the absence of a class
action-like mechanism in Ecuador and recognized how burdensome it would be for the tens
of thousands of plaintiffs to have to authorize a representative to appear in an action against
defendant Texaco in Ecuador. The Court also noted that joinder of all the plaintiffs was
technically possible in Ecuador, and therefore concluded that the system of that country was
adequate. See Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2002). In real terms,
however, such a joinder would have been impracticable, thus rendering the Ecuadorean
litigation an illusion.
42. See, e.g., Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil A Model for Civil Law Countries,
51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 329-30 (2003); GUSTAVO MAURNO ET AL., LAS ACONES
COLECTIVAS (Lexis Nexis 2005) (Argentina); Angel R. Oquendo, Upping the Ante:
Collective Litigation in Latin America, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 248, 280 (2009).
43. In its decision on the merits, however, the trial court held that EMA was applied as
the law of procedure and not the merits-, which as a matter of Ecuadorean law constitutes
an exception to the principle of non-retroactive application of the law. See Lago Agrio
Judgment, supra note 4, at 29.
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the Ecuadorean action included the lack of jurisdiction of the Sucumbios Court
over Chevron, which alleged not having ever made an investment in Ecuador,
and the lapse of the statute of limitations for bringing an action for damages.
Not surprisingly, Chevron also put forth the release from liability given to
Texaco by the Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador in 1995. 44 In its ruling on
the merits, the trial court would later conclude that when the government of
Ecuador discharged and released Texaco with regard to all of its contractual
obligations in connection with the Napo concession, it did so on behalf of the
government agencies involved and not on behalf of third parties, such as the
citizens of Lago Agrio who had not taken part in those negotiations.
45
Notwithstanding these defenses, the Sucumbios judge allowed the Lago
Agrio litigation to move forward, thus opening the floodgates to the largest, and
allegedly one of the most controversial court cases in the history of Ecuador.
Between 2003 and 2010, the parties became engaged in a protracted litigation
of unprecedented scale in the Provincial Court of Sucumbios. As anyone would
expect, the proceedings involved armies of lawyers and experts on both sides,
who produced more than two hundred thousand pages of court records.46 The
trial was also marred with endless requests for summary proceedings,
47
challenges and appeals were filed against every decision made by the court, and
a number of collateral issues were raised.4 8 Mutual accusations of professional
misconduct became frequent, as so were the allegations of widespread
corruption and undue influence.
At the heart of the court battle was the evidence-gathering process or phase
one according to a stipulation by the parties and the court. This phase
comprised more than one hundred judicial field inspections to be conducted in
the former oil fields with the purpose of determining whether the activities of
the TexPet Consortium had indeed caused any harm to the environment, and to
quantify those damages. These inspections were assigned to numerous party
and court-appointed experts, 49 each of whom produced their own reports. As
the trial court would note later when rendering its final decision on the merits,
the proceedings were marked by "challenges by both sides to the different
experts and the manner in which they performed their work, the manner in
which they were appointed and installed in their positions, and this court has
even been required to designate settling experts to resolve the alleged
contradictions between (party-appointed) experts." 50
44. See 1995 Global Settlement, supra note 34.
45. See Lago Agrio Judgment supra note 4 at 34.
46. See id. at 35.
47. See id. at 40.
48. See id. at 35.
49. See id.
50. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra note 4, at 36.
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The conclusions reached in many of the expert reports produced during the
evidentiary phase 5 1 were often contradictory with each other. In light of this,
the Sucumbios Court appointed Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega as an independent
expert to conduct a global assessment and resolve the differences between the
differing conclusions of the party-appointed experts. 52 Mr. Cabrera's report
submitted to the Court in 2008 would soon become one of the most
controversial documents in the case, and the centerpiece in Chevron's
allegations of fraud and corruption by plaintiffs. In his report, Cabrera had
concluded that the damages to the region were extensive, and that Chevron
should be ordered to pay $27 billion as compensation. 53 Unsurprisingly,
Chevron challenged the Cabrera report. It not only cast doubt about the expert's
qualifications and findings, but also questioned the validity of his appointment
process, his lack of independence from plaintiffs, and his involvement in a vast
corruption scheme of unprecedented proportions.
54
Chevron blamed the plaintiffs' legal team of coercing the presiding judge
into appointing Cabrera as an expert. 55 Additionally, Chevron accused Cabrera
of receiving tens of thousands of U.S. dollars from plaintiffs' counsel in
exchange for signing a report that was damning to Chevron. Chevron also
produced evidence demonstrating that plaintiff had ghostwritten the Cabrera
report, which Chevron not only used to undermine the report's validity but also
to build a case for fraud against the plaintiffs' legal team in the U.S. and block
any attempt to enforce the Ecuadorean judgment. Some of the evidence linking
Cabrera to the plaintiffs' counsel stems from a series of video recordings where
the expert is depicted "in a long meeting with Plaintiffs' counsel and their
consultants, discussing the drafting of Cabrera's report."
56
The irregularities of the Cabrera report were aired out, not only in Ecuador,
but also in the context of separate proceedings launched by Chevron in U.S.
federal courts to prevent enforcement of the Lago Agrio decision. The
51. Id. at 38.
52. See In re Republic of Ecuador, No. C-10-80225 MISC CRB, 2011 WL 736868, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011).
53. See Richard Stalin Cabrera Vega, Technical Summary Report 6 (2008), available
at http://www.texacotoxico.org/docs/Cabrera / 20Summaiy / CC2OReport / CC2OEnglish%/
C%final[1].pdf.
54. See Chevron Corporation's Motion Seeking the Annulment of All Rulings Made
by Hon. Juan Evangelista Sanabria of the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios at 3,
Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002/2003 (Provincial Just. Ct. of Sucumbios, Sept. 11,
2009).
55. See Chevron Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment on All Claims, Counterclaims, and Affirmative Defenses, and Summary
Judgment on Defendants' Affirmative Defense of Collateral Estoppel at 7, Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013), ECF No. 745.
56. See In re Republic of Ecuador, 2011 WL 736868, at *3.
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allegations of corruption would also become a central part of Chevron's
arguments in the international arbitration proceedings filed by Chevron and
Texaco against the Republic of Ecuador for breach of its treaty obligations with
the U.S. and later on in the enforcement proceedings in foreign jurisdictions.
The charges of corruption and misconduct in connection with the Lago
Agrio litigation were not limited to the Cabrera matter. Such accusations not
only continued after the Nueva Loja court entered its final judgment on
February 15, 2011, but also intensified. At a later date, Chevron presented
evidence to demonstrate the forgery of another expert's report, 57 and more
recently has sought to prove plaintiffs' misconduct not only in Ecuador but also
in the United States.
58
One of the latest scandals occurred in early 2013. Through a sworn
declaration submitted to a U.S. district court in late January of 2013,59 former
Ecuadorean judge Alberto Guerra, who presided over the Lago Agrio case
between 2003 and 2004, made grave allegations of corruption that involved
him, the plaintiffs' counsel, and his successor Honorable Nicolds Zambrano,
who was in charge of the Superior Court of Nueva Loja when the final decision
of the case was issued.60 In a lengthy affidavit, Guerra described with great
detail how he had been ghostwriting all decisions issued by Judge Zambrano in
the Lago Agrio case.6 1 He also explained how he had helped the plaintiffs'
counsel to move the case forward,62 and how he had received a monthly
63stipend in exchange for his illegal work, which included editing the final
judgment against Chevron. 64 Guerra's elaborated description of how the
plaintiffs' counsel and Judge Zambrano concocted a sophisticated scheme to
57. See Videotaped Deposition of Charles M. Chalmbacher, Ph.D., In re Chevron
Corp., 1:10-MI-0076-TWT-GGB (N.D.Ga. Mar. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.chevron. com/documents/pdf/ecuador/calmbacherdepo. pdf.
58. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 886 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
59. See Declaration of Alberto Guerra Bastidas at 23-27, Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013), ECF No. 746-3 (Ex. C).
60. In February 2012, Judge Nicolds Zambrano was dismissed amid allegations of
misconduct in an unrelated matter involving the release of a known drug trafficker. Aside
from the Chevron case, Judge Zambrano had gained some notoriety when in 2010 he ordered
the detention of the current President of Colombia Juan Manuel Santos, who at the time was
serving as his country's Ministry of Defense. Although the President of Ecuador's
Temporary Judicial Council (Consejo de la Judicatura Transitorio) denied any connection
between the conduct that led to the dismissal of Judge Zambrano and his role in the Lago
Agrio litigation, Chevron has insisted that such measure reaffirmed Zambrano's questionable
character and lack of competence. See CJT Judge Explains Dismissal of Chevron Case, EL
UNIVERSO, Mar. 9, 2012, available at http://www.eluniverso.com/2012/03/10/1/1355/cjt-
explica-destitucion-juez-caso-chevron.html.
61. See supra note 59.
62. Id. at 18-19.
63. Id. at 14.
64. Id. at 25-26.
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defraud the court and Chevron has added yet another of complexity to this
twenty-year-old saga.
65
The scandals and accusations of procedural misconduct have not, however,
prevented the Sucumbios Provincial Court from ruling against Chevron on the
merits of the case. On February 14, 2011, Judge Zambrano issued a 188-page
opinion whereby he ordered Chevron to pay approximately $18.2 billion in
damages. 66 From this total, $8.6 billion were intended for groundwater and soil
remediation, 67 the restoration of the native flora, fauna, and aquatic life,68 the
implementation of a potable water system, 69 a healthcare system and the
rebuilding of ethnic communities and indigenous cultures. 70 Another $864
million,7 1 or the equivalent to ten percent of the aforementioned amount of
damages were to be paid to the Amazon Defense Front, pursuant to Article 43
of the EMA.72
The remainder of the award was in the form of a conditional punitive
penalty equivalent to one hundred percent of the aggregate values of the
reparation measures,73 which Chevron could avoid if it issued a public apology
within fifteen days after the judgment was enforceable. 74 Said apology had to
be published in the most-widely publicized newspapers in Ecuador and the
75 76United States. Chevron did not apologize . In a letter addressed to Judge
Lewis Kaplan of the Southern District of New York, the company's counsel
justified its position by saying that such apology would mean an admission of
liability and a waiver of Chevron's ability to appeal the judgment and resist its
enforcement in other jurisdictions.77 This same argument would later be raised
65. Id. See also See Chevron Corporation's Memorandum of Law in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on All Claims, Counterclaims, and Affirmative
Defenses, and Summary Judgment on Defendants' Affirmative Defense of Collateral
Estoppel at 15, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28,
2013), ECF No. 745.
66. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra note 4, at 178.
67. Id. at 179, 181.
68. Id. at 182.
69. Id. at 183.
70. Id. at 184.
71. Id.
72. It is important to note, however, that the Amazon Defense Front was not a named
plaintiff in the litigation, which is a requisite under EMA. See Ley de Manejo Ambiental,
REGISTRO OFICIAL No. 245 (1999).
73. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra note 4, at 185.
74. Id. at 186.
75. Id.
76. See Chevron No Se Disculpa Por la Contaminaci6n, HOY.COM.EC, Feb. 4, 2012,
http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/chevron-no-se-disculpa-por-Ia-contaminacion-
533035.html.
77. See Letter from Randy M. Mastro to Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, Chevron Corp. v.
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by Chevron in its petition for extraordinary review before the Supreme Court of
Ecuador.
78
Unsurprisingly, Chevron appealed the trial court's decision right away.
79
At the same time, Chevron sought confirmation of a preliminary global
injunction that it had obtained on March 7, 2011, from the U.S. district court.80
Through said global injunction, which sparked considerable controversy in the
U.S. and elsewhere, 81 the district court enjoined the plaintiffs from enforcing
the Ecuadorean decision not only in the United States, but anywhere outside of
Ecuador.82 The injunction was later reversed by the Court of Appeals in
January of 2012,83 dealing a major blow to Chevron's strategy. Despite
Chevron's allegations "(1) that the judgment was fraudulently procured, in
violation of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(3); (2) that Ecuador lacks impartial
tribunals, in violation of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a)(1); and (3) that domestic and
international due process were violated in procuring the judgment, in violation
of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(a)(1)";14 the Court of Appeals found that the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act adopted by New York did not
authorize a court "to declare a foreign judgment unenforceable on the
preemptive suit of a putative judgment-debtor." 85 As a result, the only
possibility for Chevron, according to the Court of Appeals, was to challenge the
foreign judgment's validity defensively; that is, in response to an attempt to
enforce by the defendant-appellees (the Lago Agrio plaintiffs), which had not
Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011).
78. See Memorandum in Support of Request for Extraordinary Revision (Recurso de
Casaci6n) (filed with the National Court of Justice of Ecuador (NCJE) on March 29, 2012 at
158, available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/ecuador/ChevronCassationAppeal
.pdf
79. See Memorandum in Support of Request for Appeal, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp.,
No. 002/2003 (Provincial Just. Ct. of Sucumbios, Mar. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/51496370/3-9-11-Chevron-Lago-Agrio-Appeal.pal. Moreover,
the plaintiffs also filed a limited appeal to the trial court's ruling, but only with respect to the
decision's omission to address the economic loss suffered by plaintiffs, the harm sustained
by the ancestral territories of the indigenous peoples, and the damages arising out of the spill
of crude on the roads and other structures. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 002/2003 at 1
(Provincial Just. Ct. of Sucumbios, Jan. 3, 2012).
80. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
81. See Brief of International Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Defendants-Appellants and Dissolving the Preliminary Injunction, Chevron Corp. v.
Mendoza, No. 11-1150 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2011), ECF No. 292; see also Brief of Business
Roundtable and International Law Scholars as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-
Appellee, Chevron Corp. v. Mendoza, No. 11-1150 (2d Cir. Aug. 10, 2011), ECF No. 283.
82. See Chevron, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 660.
83. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 2012).
84. Id. at 240.
85. Id.
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been undertaken anywhere until that point. 86
The first known attempt by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs to enforce the Lago
Agrio judgment did not occur until mid-2012, several months after a decision
by the Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios dismissed Chevron's appeal in
early January. 87 The appellate ruling was particularly strong worded. In it the
appellate panel chastised Chevron for its procedural conduct in Ecuador and the
United States, and also lamented Judge Kaplan's negative characterization of
the Ecuadorean justice system as his basis for issuing the March 17, 2011,
global injunction against the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. In addition to reaffirming
the trial court's ruling in its entirety, the appellate court also ordered Chevron
to pay court and attorney fees for what the court deemed an abusive use of
process, and "manifest procedural bad faith."88
As a matter of Ecuadorean law, the trial court decision became readily
enforceable once the Provincial Court of Sucumbios confirmed it.
8 9
Nevertheless, Chevron still had the right to file a writ of extraordinary review
(Recurso de Casaci6n) before the National Justice Court of Ecuador (NJCE),
which could result in the annulment of the proceedings. The NJCE's scope of
review at that level is, nonetheless, very narrow for it can only reverse the
lower court's decision if it finds that the judge misapplied or misinterpreted a
rule, a binding judicial precedent, or committed a grave error of law.9" At the
time of writing the NJCE decision is still pending, and there is no clear
indication as to when the parties should expect a ruling.
In Ecuador, the filing of a Recurso de Casaci6n does not suspend the
enforcement of the lower court's decision, unless the appellant has entered a
judicial bond.9 1 The purpose of the bond in this case would be to guarantee that
the Lago Agrio plaintiffs would be compensated for any losses that might result
from the delay in enforcing the decision during the pendency of the review.
92
86. Id.
87. See Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 2011-0106 (Provincial Just. Ct. of Sucumbios,
Jan. 3, 2012) (Ecuador).
88. Id. at 17. See Article 148 of the Organic Code for the Judicial Function (C6digo
Orgfnico de la Funci6n Judicial) (Ecuador). See also Article 346 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (C6digo de Procedimiento Civil, CCP) (Ecuador).
89. See CCP, Article 300(5). See also Cassation Act, Article 10 (Ley de Casaci6n)
(Ecuador).
90. See Cassation Act, Article 3.
91. See Cassation Act, Article 11. The enforceability of a judgment subject to review
reflects a trend among civil law tradition countries. See also LORENA NARANJO GODOY,
Consecuencias de la Ejecuci6n de la Sentencia que ha sido impugnada en Casaci6n, 6 REV.
DERECHO at 98 (2006). Notwithstanding, there are still some Latin American jurisdictions
such as Peru (Article 393 CCP), Costa Rica (Article 599 CCP), and Venezuela (Article 316
CCP), where the pendency of an extraordinary review by the highest Court suspends the
enforcement of the lower court's decision.
92. See Cassation Act, Article 11.
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The Court can only set bond if the interested party requests it, but it has
discretion as to the amount. 93 Given the sums at stake in the Lago Agrio
dispute, had Chevron requested the Court to set bond, it is likely that the Court
would have estimated it in several billions of U.S. dollars.
Predictably, Chevron did not request the bond to be determined but still
asked the NJCE to suspend enforcement of the lower court's decision. Chevron
did not ground its petition on a specific provision of Ecuadorean procedural law
or a domestic court order, but rather on an interim measure issued by an
international arbitral panel appointed to hear a dispute between Chevron,
Texaco, and the Republic of Ecuador. 94 The tactical use of international
arbitration in parallel with foreign judicial proceedings as a way to block the
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment in Ecuador and elsewhere seemed
innovative and has certainly contributed to shaping the landscape of
transnational litigation, but its results are still to be seen in the present case.
B. Chevron 's Preemptive Attempt to Block Enforcement
When the Provincial Court of Sucumbios entered its final judgment in
February of 2011, Chevron had already moved in at least two different fronts
outside of Ecuador to block the enforcement of an imminent adverse judgment.
As the company did not have any significant assets in Ecuador, enforcement in
that nation was not a real concern. Notwithstanding, because of Chevron's
significant investments in many other countries, 95 the company had to take
protective measures outside of Ecuador.
Chevron made the first move to protect itself from an adverse ruling in
2009, when it filed-alongside Texaco-an investment arbitration claim against
the Republic of Ecuador, pursuant to a bilateral investment treaty in force
between Ecuador and the United States.96 In that arbitration, Chevron and
93. Id.
94. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures (Feb. 9, 2011), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO 167.pdf.
95. In the plaintiffs' statement of claim submitted to the Superior Court of Justice of
Ontario on May 30, 2012, to seek enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment in Canada,
counsel for the plaintiffs asserted: "Chevron is the third largest corporation domiciled in the
United States. It is a Delaware Corporation which through 73 subsidiaries engages in
petroleum operations, chemical operations, mining operations, power generation, and energy
services in many countries of the world, including Canada." See Chevron Corp. v. Republic
of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Amended Statement of Claim to the
Ontario Superior Court of Justice at 4 (May 30, 2012), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0934.pdf.
96. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Claimant's Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/ default/files/case-documents/itaO155_O.pdf.
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Texaco alleged that the Republic of Ecuador, through its various organs, had
colluded with and supported the Lago Agrio plaintiffs to illegitimate extract
money the companies. 97 Chevron and Texaco asserted that Ecuador had
allowed the use of coercive tactics against them through the country's civil and
criminal justice systems, including "the sham indictment of two Chevron
attorneys in an attempt to undermine the settlement, release agreements, and
interfere Chevron's defense in the Lago Agrio litigation."9 8 All of this,
claimants alleged, was in breach of different investment agreements between
them and the Republic of Ecuador, and it also ran against Ecuador's treaty
obligations with the United States.
99
In more concrete terms, claimants accused Ecuador of failing to "provide
Claimants' investment fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security,
and treatment no less than that required by international law"; 100 of failing to
provide claimants with "effective means of asserting claims and enforcing
rights with respect to investment and investment agreements,"' 0' 1 and of
discriminating against claimants, and breaching other obligations. 102 In the
course of the aforementioned arbitration proceedings-which are still
underway-the tribunal has issued at least five interim orders, 10 3 and four
interim awards as precautionary measures for claimants. 104 Through these
actions, the tribunal has ordered Ecuador "to take all measures necessary to
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 2.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures (May 14, 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Republic of
Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim Measures (Dec. 6,
2010); Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23,
Order for Interim Measures (Jan. 28, 2011); Order for Interim Measures (Dec. 6, 2010);
Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for
Interim Measures (Feb. 6, 2011); Order for Interim Measures (Dec. 6, 2010); Chevron Corp.
v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Order for Interim
Measures (Mar. 16, 2011).
104. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, First Interim Award on Interim Measures (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0173.pdf; Chevron Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Interim Award on
Interim Measures (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0174 0.pdf; Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL
Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Interim Measures (Feb. 27, 2012),
available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO75.pdf; Chevron
Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23, Fourth Interim
Award on Interim Measures (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/italawl274.pdf.
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suspend or cause to be suspended the enforcement and recognition both within
and without Ecuador of the Lago Agrio judgment."' 10 5
When Chevron requested the NJCE to suspend the effects of the lower
court's decision and prevent plaintiffs from seeking to enforce the judgment, it
argued that the arbitral panel's authority rested on international law principles
binding on the Republic of Ecuador and its internal organs. 106 Noncompliance
with the arbitral tribunal's interim measures, Chevron stressed, "would put the
state of Ecuador in breach of an order from an international tribunal and [in
defiance of] Ecuador's international obligations."' 107 Notwithstanding the
arbitral panel's orders, the Ecuadorean court went ahead and certified the
judgment, thus declaring it enforceable and subject to execution in Ecuador. 10 8
A few months later, in October of 2012, the Provincial Court of Justice of
Sucumbios decreed the attachment of all assets belonging to Chevron,
including its subsidiaries, and affiliates. In its order, the Court listed all the
companies mentioned Chevron's annual report (Form 10K) submitted to the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 10 9 The attachment order not only
covered assets owned by Chevron in Ecuador, but also in Argentina, 10 and
Colombia.'II Notably, though, that same order also informed Ecuador's
Attorney General of another attachment for the amount of $96 million against
the Republic of Ecuador in compliance with an award that resolved an earlier
investment arbitration filed by Texaco and Chevron in 2006 (BIT Arbitration
I)112
In the BIT Arbitration I proceeding, Texaco and Chevron had alleged that
the undue delay caused by Ecuadorean courts in deciding seven separate
lawsuits pending against the government of Ecuador was tantamount to a denial
of justice and hence a breach of the Bilateral Investment Treaty between the
United States and Ecuador. 113 The arbitral tribunal ruled for Chevron and
105. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures at 29 (Feb. 7, 2013), available at
http://italaw.com/sites/ default/files/case-documents/italawl274.pdf.
106. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Claimant's Notice of Arbitration (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO155 0.pdf.
107. Id.
108. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb.,PCACase
No. 2009-23, Fourth Interim Award on Interim Measures at 29 (Feb. 7, 2013), available at
http://italaw.com/sites/ default/files/case-documents/italawl274.pdf.
109. See Order of Attachment, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 2011-0106 (Provincial
Just. Ct. of Sucumbios, Oct. 15, 2012) (Ecuador).
110. Id. at9.
111 . Id. at 11.
112. Id.
113. Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23,
Request for Arbitration (Dec. 21, 2006).
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Texaco and ordered Ecuador to pay $96 million in damages. 114 Right after the
final award was issued, Ecuador moved to set it aside in The Netherlands,
which proved unsuccessful.' 15 Therefore, after the Dutch district court denied
Ecuador's petition to vacate the award in July of 2012,116 Chevron and Texaco
moved to confirm it in the U.S. federal district court. 117 In this latter
proceeding, which was decided by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia on June 6, 2013,118 Ecuador had opposed the confirmation on two
grounds. First, that the Republic never consented to arbitrate pre-BIT
investment disputes with Chevron. Second, that the arbitral award is contrary to
the public policy of the United States insofar as it disregards the sovereignty of
Ecuador and the autonomy of the ongoing judicial proceedings in that
country. 119 The district court rejected Ecuador's defenses and granted
Chevron's petition to confirm the award. 1
20
Prior to the district court's decision to confirm, Ecuador's Attorney
General publicly declared that once the various challenges were decided, the
Republic would comply with the outcome of the first arbitration, 12 1 but that
remains to be seen. In a separate front, Ecuador has rejected the fourth interim
award issued by the arbitral tribunal constituted in 2009.122 Ecuador deems
such interim award as problematic and contrary to its internal constitutional
order. In Ecuador's view, the tribunal overstepped its power when it ordered
the Republic to interfere with a legal dispute between private citizens. Ecuador
considers the tribunal's award as threatening the independence of its organs and
the autonomy of the Ecuadorean judiciary. 123 On the other hand, Chevron has
114. Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case No. 2009-23,
Final Award (Aug. 31, 2011).
115. See Ecuador's Petition to Set Aside Arbitral Award, Ecuador v. Chevron Corp.,
Rechtbank's-Gravenhage [HA ZA] [District Court in The Hague], Feb. 2, 2012, 386934/HA
ZA 11-402 & 408948/HA ZA 11-2813 (Neth.).
116. See Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., Rechtbank's-Gravenhage [HA ZA] [District Court
in The Hague], May 2, 2012, 386934/HA ZA 11-402 & 408948/11A ZA 11-2813 (Neth.).
117. See Petition to Confirm Arbitration Against Republic of Ecuador, Chevron Corp.
v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 12-cv-01247-JEB (D.D.C. July 27, 2012), ECF No. 1.
118. Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, No. 12-cv-01247-JEB, 2013 WL 2449172
(D.D.C. June 6, 2013).
119. See Response to Motion to Confirm Foreign Arbitral Award, Chevron Corp. v.
Republic of Ecuador, No. 12-cv-01247-JEB, at 16 (D. D.C. Mar. 25, 2013), ECF No. 33.
120. See Chevron Corp., 2013 WL 2449172, at 1.
121. See Diario Hoy, Ecuador Cumpliri con fiallo en caso Chevron, asegura Garcia,
HoY.COM, Sep. 26, 2012, http://www.hoy.com.ec/noticias-ecuador/ecuador-cumplira-con-
fallo-en-caso-chevron-asegura-garcia-562442.html.
122. See supra note 105.
123. See Attorney General of the Republic of Ecuador (Procuraduria General del
Estado), Procuraduria General del Estado rechaza cuarto laudo interino en Caso Chevron,
Feb. 13, 2013, available at http://www.pge.gob.ec/es/boletines/255-febrero-2013 /1953-
procuraduria-general-del-estado-rechaza-cuarto-laudo-interino-en-caso-chevrn-3.html.
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argued that as a matter of international public law the Republic of Ecuador as a
whole is responsible for the actions of its organs, thus making Ecuador liable
for the misdeeds of its judiciary branch. 124
The second front in Chevron's preemptive anti-enforcement effort was the
filing-merely two weeks prior to the Lago Agrio judgment-in a U.S. federal
district court of a sweeping complaint based on the Racketeering Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 125 The RICO lawsuit was brought
against several individuals and business entities, lawyers, consultants, third-
party funders, and forty-seven of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs for allegedly seeking
"to extort, defraud, and otherwise tortuously injure plaintiff Chevron"' 126
through the use of a "sham litigation in Lago Agrio, Ecuador." 127 Through this
action, which is also in progress, Chevron not only seeks to obtain damages,
but a series of permanent injunctions that would preclude co-defendants from
enforcing-in the United States and elsewhere-any judgment emanating from
the Lago Agrio proceedings in Ecuador.
128
After hundreds of filings, more than thirty orders and opinions, and an
extensive discovery activity, the district court recently concluded that "Chevron
has established at least probable cause to believe there was fraud or other
criminal activity in the procurement of the Judgment and in other respects
relating to the Lago Agrio litigation in which that Judgment was rendered and
in certain litigations in the United States relating to the Ecuadorian
litigation." 12 9 Other U.S. courts have made similar preliminary findings in the
context of various ancillary proceedings. 130 A final decision on the merits is yet
to be reached in the RICO litigation, and whichever the outcome is the losing
party will likely challenge it aggressively. Meanwhile, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs
have embarked in a quest of global proportions to enforce the Lago Agrio
judgment outside of Ecuador, which I now turn to describe in the following
124. See Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, UNCITRAL Arb., PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Claimant's Letter to the Tribunal at 8 (Jan. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/itaO171.pdf; see also United
Nations, Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts. Text adopted by the
Commission at its fifty-third session, in 2001, and submitted to the General Assembly as a
part of the Commission's report covering the work of that session. Annex to General
Assembly resolution 56/83 of Dec. 12, 2001, and corrected by document A/56/49(Vol. I)
/Corr.4.
125. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1968.
126. See Amended Complaint at 1, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 Civ. 0691
(LAK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2011) [hereinafter "Chevron RICO Complaint"].
127. Id. at 2.
128. Id. at 147.
129. See Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 11 CIV. 0691 LAK, 2013 WL 1087236, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2013).
130. Id. at 97.
[Vol. 1:2
THE GLOBAL CHASE
part.
C. Chasing Chevron 's Assets Around the Globe
Well aware of the fact that Chevron did not have any assets in Ecuador,
and of the practical difficulties of enforcing the Lago Agrio judgment in the
United States during the pendency of the RICO claim and other ancillary
proceedings, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs shifted their attention to Canada,
Argentina and Brazil. In May of 2012, Canada became the first jurisdiction
outside of Ecuador where the Lago Agrio plaintiffs attempted to enforce the
Lago Agrio judgment. The action was filed against Chevron Canada Limited
and Chevron Canada Finance. 13 1 The Lago Agrio plaintiffs asserted that, as
wholly owned subsidiaries of Chevron and because the same board of directors
controlled both entities, the Canadian companies were necessary parties and
therefore should be held liable as judgment debtors. 132 By attempting to satisfy
the judgment with assets of two Canadian corporations owned or substantially
controlled by Chevron instead of going after Chevron's own interest in those
Canadian subsidiaries, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs tried to bypass some obstacles
in the enforcement process but inevitably put themselves in a difficult position.
One important hurdle was to persuade the Ontario court to pierce the
corporate veil of the Canadian entities against which enforcement is sought. 
133
This variation of the corporate veil piercing doctrine-so-called "reverse
piercing"-is far from being settled in Canada. 134  Moreover, even the
application of the traditional veil piercing doctrine, by which the corporate
shroud of a subsidiary is disregarded because of its close relationship with the
parent corporation, has been applied very narrowly by Canadian courts. 
135
Two necessary conditions are required in Canada to disregard the
separation between a subsidiary and its parent company. First, that the parent
company exercises "complete control" and not just owns the subsidiary. 136 For
example, the condition would not be met in a case where the subsidiary is fully
owned by the parent and the board of the subsidiary is comprised of executives
131. See Plaintiffs' Statement of Claim at 1, Yaiguaje v. Chevron, No. CV-12-454778
(Can. Ont. Super. Ct. J. Sept. May 30, 2012).
132. Id. at 17
133. See Michael Richardson, The Helter Skelter Application of the Reverse Piercing
Doctrine, 79 U. CrN. L. REV. 9 (2011); see also Kurtis A. Kemper, Acceptance and
Application ofReverse Veil Piercing, 2 A.L.R. 6th 195 (2005).
134. See, e.g., Foresight Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (2004 FC 231) (Can.).
135. See, e.g., Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Ins. Co. (1987) 1 SCR 2 (Can.); Gregorio
v. Intrans-Corp. 18 O.R. (3d) 527 (Can.); and, Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of Canada v.
Canada Life Ins. Co. (1996), 28 OR (3d) 423 (Ont. S.C.) (Can.).
136. See Transamerica Life Ins. Co. of Canada v. Canada Life Ins. Co. (1996), 28 OR
(3d) 423 at 22 (Ont. S.C.) (Can.).
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of the parent, but the former conducts business separately from the parent and
has an independent management from it. 137 The other requirement is that the
conduct of the entity which corporate veil is to be pierced had engaged in a
"conduct akin to fraud that would otherwise unjustly deprive claimants of their
rights." 
138
During the hearings held at the Supreme Court of Ontario, Chevron
challenged the jurisdiction of Canadian courts by arguing that the corporate
entities against which enforcement was being sought were independent from
Chevron, 139 which only had an indirect influence on them. 140 Chevron also
asserted that it had no "real and substantial connection" with Canada, which is
essential for a Canadian court to establish jurisdiction. 14 1 Should the Ontario
Court determine that such connection existed and thus assumed jurisdiction,
then Chevron would only be able to raise a limited defense based on fraud,
denial of natural justice,142 or on a violation to the public policy of Canada. 143
After examining the facts of the case, the arguments on both sides, and the
evidence put forth by the parties, on May 1, 2013, the Superior Court of Justice
of Ontario granted Chevron's request and stayed the proceedings to recognize
and enforce the Ecuadorean judgment. 144 After a thorough analysis, which
entailed an assessment of the strength's of Lago Agrio plaintiffs' case, 145 the
Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to recognize and enforce the Lago
Agrio judgment due to the fact that Chevron Corporation does not have assets,
direct corporate presence, or any direct business activity in Canada.
146
137. Id.
138. Id. at 27-28.
139. For a thorough commentary on the possible jurisdictional defenses in the course of
the Canadian enforcement action, see P. Balabuch, The Canadian Legal Perspective on
Challenging Enforcement ofthe $18.2 Billion Ecuadorean Judgment against Chevron, Part
I, Nov. 15, 2012, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-
advance-publication-article.asp?key-470.
140. Id.
141. See Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] SCC 72, [2003] 3 SCR 416 (Can.) ("Subject to the
legislatures adopting a different approach, the 'real and substantial connection' test, which
has until now only been applied to interprovincial judgments, should apply equally to the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The test requires that a significant
connection exist between the cause of action and the foreign court.").
142. See Balabuch, supra note 139.
143. Id; see also Nicholas Pengelley, 'We All Have Too Mich Invested to Stop':
Enforcing Chevron in Canada, THE ADVOCATE'S QUARTERLY, June 24, 2012, available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2090091; Antonin Pribetic, Comments on the Lago Agrio
Plaintiffs Enforcement Action in Canada, June 5, 2012, available at
http://lettersblogatoiy.com/2012/06/05/pribetic-lago-agrio-canada.
144. See Ontario Superior Court Ruling, supra note 9.
145. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 106 (Can.), available at
http://canlii.ca/t/ldxl.
146. Id. at 89,90
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Moreover, the Court also concluded that Chevron Canada, which is a seventh
generation indirectly-owned subsidiary of Chevron Corporation, is not a party
to the Ecuadorean judgment, and its shares "are not exigible in satisfaction of
the judgment." 147
The Court also found no basis for accepting the Lago Agrio plaintiffs'
request to pierce the corporate veil of Chevron Canada based on an alleged
abuse of separate corporate structures by the Chevron Corporation to avoid or
conceal its liability with regard to the Lago Agrio judgment. 14 8 The Court
concluded that, albeit belonging to the same "worldwide 'family' of
companies" both Chevron Canada and Chevron Corporation are managed
separately, thus impeding the application of the alter ego argument put forth by
Lago Agrio plaintiffs. 14 9 Chevron Canada, the Court said "operates its business
in a fashion which is separate and distinct from that of its parents up in the
corporate 'family tree', subject to the direction of its own board of directors
which does not contain any over-lapping members with the Chevron board or
executive." 
150
Moreover, the Court established that nothing in the record suggested that
Chevron Canada was either linked to the events that gave rise to the Lago
Agrio judgment, or had engaged in any fraudulent activity to help Chevron
avoid its potential liability with regard to the Lago Agrio judgment. 15 1 As a
result, the Court concluded that "there is nothing in Ontario to fight over," and
ultimately recommended the parties to "take their fight elsewhere to some
jurisdiction where any ultimate recognition of the Ecuadorean Judgment will
have a practical effect."' 152 Through a press release issued the same day of the
Ontario Court's ruling Lago Agrio plaintiffs vowed to appeal the decision, 
53
so the Canadian court fight is far from being over.
Notwithstanding, this recent setback to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs' efforts to
enforce the Lago Agrio judgment will likely have effect not only in Ontario,
but also in other Canadian courts, and even in some foreign jurisdictions.
Although highly improbable, an ultimate acceptance of the Lago Agrio
judgment in Canada could encourage the courts of other states to follow suit.
On the other hand, a refusal based on lack of jurisdiction such as the one
recently rendered by the Ontario Court, or supported by fraud, denial of justice,
147. Id. at 91
148. Id. at 95
149. Id.
150. Id. at 99
151. Id. at 105 et seq.
152. Id. at 111.
153. See Daniel Gilbert & Angel Gonzfilez, Court Deals Blow to Ecuador Plaintffs in
Chevron Case, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2013, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887324766604578457571045690966.html.
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or a violation of public policy, could arguably set an adverse precedent for
Lago Agrio plaintiffs and produce a chilling effect on the courts of other states
where enforcement is sought.
154
II. FROM THE AMAZON TO THE SOUTHERN CONE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT IN
BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA
One of the effects of the extensive discovery led by Chevron in the context
of the RICO lawsuit pending in U.S. courts was the revelation of a significant
cache of otherwise private and confidential documents emanated from the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs, its counsel, and third parties connected to the Lago Agrio
litigation. A key document obtained by Chevron was a memorandum code
named the "Invictus Report," prepared for a prospective third-party funder by
the law firm Patton Boggs on behalf of the plaintiffs. 155 In addition to outlining
a proposed litigation strategy to lead the case toward a favorable judgment, the
Invictus Report contained a description of a possible settlement scenario, and a
multi-country enforcement plan geared to assist plaintiffs attain their goal. 1
56
That enforcement plan identified nations that were parties to a judgment
enforcement treaty with other states where Chevron might have assets, or
nations that had a policy of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments
(keystone nations). 157 Moreover, the memo laid out some factors to consider
when selecting an enforcing forum, 158 and also listed a group of jurisdictions,
which plaintiffs' counsel deemed of particular interest for these purposes.
159
Among the countries mentioned on the list were Brazil and Argentina, which in
that same order received petitions from the Lago Agrio plaintiffs seeking the
recognition and enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment. 16 We now turn to
discuss these.
The legal framework for the recognition and enforcement of a judgment
154. See Balabuch, supra note 139, at 10.
155. See Letter from Burford Group to Sephen R. Donziger, Sep. 29, 2011, at 2 n.1 (on
file with author).
156. See Chevron RICO Complaint supra note 126 at 115.
157. See Invictus Report at 18, available at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/chevinvictusreport.pdf.
158. Id. at 18-19.
159. Id. at 20.
160. In Brazil, the application was filed on June 27, 2012, and in Argentina on
November 1, 2013. While the Brazilian courts are yet to render any decision, the case in
Argentina has been already decided by the Supreme Court. By a ruling handed down on June
4, 2013, the Argentine Supreme Court revoked an attachment order of assets previously
confirmed by the court of appeals on January 29, 2013, and thus sided with Chevron. See
Petition for Review of Denial of Appeal, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., File A.253.XLIX.REX
(Sup. Ct. June 4, 2013) (Argentina), available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/confal/
ConsultaCompletaFallos.do?method verAnalisisDocumental&id 702200.
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issued by the courts of one state in the territory of another state is far from
uniform. Even within the United States, the standard for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment differs from state to state. 161 Moreover, the
absence of a common federal regime to govern the domestication of a judgment
or judicial decree creates a series of problems, including the encouragement of
a pernicious type of forum shopping motivated by the fact that once a judgment
is recognized by any state, all other states are expected to enforce it pursuant to
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
162
The differences are also startling between Latin American countries, even
though their main legal institutions developed almost concurrently under the
aegis of the civil law tradition. 163 Based on these similarities in their legal
systems and their common origin, the common perception is that the procedural
laws of Latin American countries are alike, and that the national legal systems
of the countries that comprise the region operate in more or less in the same
way. 164 This is obviously not true. Regardless of their common roots and
shared features, each of the twenty countries that comprise the Latin American
region has a unique civil litigation system with distinct procedural rules, and
public policy considerations that their national courts apply taking into account
their own social, political and economic context. 
165
In an attempt to overcome such disparities and to facilitate the enforcement
of judgments and the fulfillment of precautionary measures across national
borders, Latin American states have encouraged judicial cooperation strategies
through regional treaties and other international agreements. Two of these
treaties are particularly important in the realm of the recognition and
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment outside of Ecuador because of their
adoption by the nations chosen by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs to seek collection
of the judgment. The first one is the Inter American Convention on the
Extraterritorial Efficacy of Judicial Decisions and Foreign Arbitral Awards
(Extraterritorial Efficacy Convention) 166 of which Argentina, Brazil, and
Ecuador are signatories. 167 The other one is the Inter-American Convention on
161. See Cedric C. Chao & Christine S. Neuhoff, Enforcement and Recognition of
Foreign Judgments in United States Courts: A Practical Perspective, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 147,
148 (2002).
162. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See also Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage:
Jurisdictional Competition and the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United
States, 54 HARV. INT'L. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) at 2.
163. See generally JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
1 (3d ed. 2007).
164. Id.
165. See supra note 25.
166. Id.
167. See Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial Efficacy of Judicial
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Execution of Preventive Measures (Preventive Measures Convention), which is
in force in Argentina and Ecuador. 168 The common purpose of these
Conventions is to simplify the recognition and enforcement of judicial
measures (precautionary measures and final judgments) rendered in the
territory of a state party so they can be easily fulfilled in another state member.
In order to achieve this, the Conventions contain two types of provisions.
Comprising the first type are provisions that require the foreign judgment for
which recognition and enforcement are sought to comply with a list of formal
requirements that attest to the judgments' external legitimacy. 169 The second
type of rules is more substantive in nature, and the rules' functions are to
ensure that a competent authority issued a foreign judgment or preventive
measure. 170 Furthermore, the Conventions require that the court where the
judgment originated provided fundamental procedural protections to the party
against whom the judgment or preventive measures were directed, 17 1 and that
the foreign judgment or measure is consistent with the public order of the state
where recognition and enforcement is sought. 
172
Another enforcement treaty adopted in the context of the Southern Trade
Decisions and Foreign Arbitral Awards, Aug. 5, 1979, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/caicmoe.asp. The treaty was ratified by by the
Republic of Argentina on December 1, 1983, by the Federative Republic of Brazil on
November 27, 1995, and by the Republic of Ecuador on January 6, 1982.
168. See Inter-American Convention on Execution of Preventive Measures, Aug. 5,
1979, available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-42.html. Both of these
conventions arose out of the Second Inter-American At the Specialized Conference on
Private International Law (CIDIP II), held in Montevideo, Uruguay, in 1979 [hereinafter
"Preventive Measures Convention"].
169. See Extraterritorial Efficacy Convention art. 2. ("The foreign judgments, awards
and decisions referred to in Article 1 shall have extraterritorial validity in the States Parties if
they meet the following conditions: a. They fulfill all the formal requirements necessary for
them to be deemed authentic in the State of origin; b. The judgment, award or decision and
the documents attached thereto that are required under this Convention are duly translated
into the official language of the State where they are to take effect; c. They are presented
duly legalized in accordance with the law of the State in which they are to take effect; d. The
judge or tribunal rendering the judgment is competent in the international sphere to try the
matter and to pass judgment on it in accordance with the law of the State in which the
judgment, award or decision is to take effect.").
170. See Montevideo Convention of 1979 art. 2(d). This provision was, however,
excluded by Brazil via a reservation made upon signing the Convention. See Montevideo
Convention at Reservation by Brazil art. 2(d), available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/caicmoe.asp.
171. Id. at art. 2(e)-(f).
172. Id. at art. 2(h). In the specific case of the Extraterritorial Efficacy Convention,
another substantive requirement is the finality of the foreign judgment. This is not required
under the Preventive Measures Convention, which only applies to temporary injunctions
issued in the context of pending or future judicial proceedings in the territory of another state
party. See Preventive Measures Convention art. 1.
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Bloc (STB), 173 of which Argentina and Brazil are members and Ecuador is an
associated member, is the Protocol on Cooperation and Judicial Assistance in
Civil, Commercial, Labor, and Administrative Matters (Las Lehas Protocol), 174
which facilitates the enforcement of judgments rendered by the courts of STB
states. Similar to the Montevideo Conventions, the Las Lehas Protocol also
features a streamlined process that basically requires the foreign judgment to
fulfill some formal175 and substantive 176 requirements, in order to be
recognized and enforced by the courts of another state. All of these treaties,
however, acknowledge that each contracting state may have its own domestic
recognition and enforcement rules, which their national courts apply in
coordination with the corresponding treaty provisions.
A. The Hurdles of Recognizing the Lago Agrio Judgment in Brazil
In the case of Brazil, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
(known as homologaqdo de sentenqas estrangeiras) is regulated by a number of
federal statutes, including the Code of Civil Procedure, 177 the Introductory Act
to the Rules of Brazilian Law, 17 and the rules governing the Supreme Tribunal
of Justice (STJ, or Supremo Tribunal de Justiga). 179 As a matter of Brazilian
law, the homologag!o of a foreign judgment, such as one proffered by the
Nueva Loja Court to end the Lago Agrio litigation, is granted upon careful
scrutiny by the STJ and entails a two-step process set forth in STJ's Resolution
9. The first step, which comprises a confirmation procedure carried out by the
STJ,180 warrants an assessment of both formal and substantive requirements.
173. More commonly known as MERCOSUR in Spanish, or MERCOSUL in
Portuguese.
174. Approved by Decision CMC No. 5/92 by the Meeting of Justice Ministries of
MERCOSUR, on June 27, 1992.
175. See Las Lefias Protocol art. 20 (a)-(b)
176. Id. at art. 20(c)-(f)
177. See Code of Civil Procedure [C.P.C.] art. 483 & 384 (Brazil), Lei 5869/73. It is
important to note, however, that article 483 CPC was abrogated by the constitutional
amendment of 2004, which took away the jurisdiction to recognize foreign judgments from
the Supreme Federal Tribunal and assigned it to the Tribunal Superior de Justiga. See
Federal Constitution, art. 105, 1, i (Brazil), amendment 45/2004 ("Compete ao Superior
Tribunal de Justiga: I- processar e julgar, originariamente: i) a homologag~o de sentengas
estrangeiras e a concessdo de exequatur is cartas rogat6rias").
178. See Lei No. 12,376 de 30 de Dezembro de 2010 "Lei de Introdugao do Direito
Brasileiro [Introductory Act to Brazilian Law] (Dec. 30, 2010) (Brazil), available at
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/ Ato2007-2010/2010/Lei/L12376.htm#art2.
179. See Resolugao No. 9 de 4 de Maio de 2005, Supremo Tribunal do Justiga [S.T.J.],
(May 4, 2005) (Braz), available at http://www.stj.jus.br/SCON/legislacao/doc.jsp?livre=
cartas+rogatF3rias&&b=LEGI&p=true&t=&l=20&i= [hereinafter "TSJ Resolution 9"].
180. See CONSTITUIQAO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 105(I)(i) (Brazil)
("Compete ao Superior Tribunal de Justiga: I- processar e julgar, originariamente: i) a
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As to the former, the STJ will only review a petition that is accompanied by
duly translated certified copies of all relevant documents, including obviously
the foreign judgment, and supporting files. 18 1
Regarding the substantive requirements, the requesting party shall produce
evidence that the foreign judgment was issued by a competent authority, 182 that
the party against whom enforce is being sought was properly notified of the
proceedings,183 that the foreign judgment has produced res judicata effect on
the parties (transito em julgado),' 84 and that it does not offend Brazil's
sovereignty and public order. 185 Despite allowing the STJ to examine the
foreign court's compliance with due process and whether the judgment
produced res judicata effect, enabling scrutiny of the foreign judgment against
the Brazilian public order, the Resolution Nine mechanism is not meant to
entail a relitigation of the issues considered in the course of the foreign trial
from which the judgment arose. In fact, a relitigation of the issues already
decided by the foreign court or a lengthy proceeding in the enforcing
jurisdiction is precisely what international judicial cooperation tries to avoid.
It is important to note, however, that in its lengthy reply to the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs' application,' 86 Chevron raised several arguments that will likely
sway the STJ to go beyond the limited scrutiny of the minimum requirements
set forth in Resolution Nine. 187 Among its challenges, Chevron asserted the
lack of jurisdiction of the Brazilian judiciary to recognize and enforce the Lago
Agrio judgment against a foreign party with no meaningful contacts with
Brazil. Chevron also questioned the proper representation, or lack thereof, of
the petitioners to act on behalf of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs, and challenged the
efficacy of the Lago Agrio judgment in light of the precautionary measures
issued by the arbitral panel in the aforementioned bilateral investment treaty
arbitration. As a result, the quandary for STJ will be to be able to weigh in on
these challenges, while avoiding a re-examination of the merits of the Lago
Agrio judgment.
In its reply to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs' application to domesticate the
Lago Agrio judgment, Chevron raised similar arguments to the ones presented
in the context of the international investment arbitration proceedings against the
homologagfio de sentengas estrangeiras e a concessgo de exequatur ?s cartas rogat6rias").
181. See TSJ Resolution 9, supra note 179, art. 3, 5(IV).
182. Id. at art. 5(I).
183. Id. at art. 5(11).
184. Id. at art. 5(111).
185. Id. at art. 6.
186. See Memorandum of Chevron Corporation in Opposition to the Petition to
Recognize and Enforce Foreign Ecuadorean Judgment, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., S.T.J.,
Pet. 8542, Relator: Min. Andrighi (Sup. Trib. Justice, Mar. 11, 2013) (Brazil) [hereinafter
"Chevron's Reply in Brazil"].
187. See TSJ Resolution 9, supra note 179, art. 5.
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Republic of Ecuador, and in the RICO litigation currently underway in U.S.
federal courts. A significant portion of the 152-page memorandum filed by
Chevron in the STJ is devoted to describing in great detail the allegations of
corruption and professional misconduct by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs and their
counsel in the U.S. and Ecuador, and also to discussing the alleged role of the
Ecuadorean government in victimizing Chevron and assisting the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs in winning their case.
The consideration that STJ may end up giving to Chevron's sweeping
accusations will depend on whether the STJ decides to maintain a narrow
interpretation of Resolution Nine, and thus limit its substantive analysis to
whether Chevron was properly served of the Lago Agrio proceedings in
Ecuador, whether the foreign judgment has produced res judicata effect, and
whether it offends the Brazilian public order. On the contrary, if STJ decides to
look deeper into the challenges that seek to taint the conduct of Ecuador and the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs prior to the Lago Agrio judgment, it will certainly be
broadening the application of the Resolution Nine mechanism.
Whereas the scope of application of Resolution Nine to foreign judgments
has been aptly discussed by Brazilian courts, the recognition of the Lago Agrio
litigation poses unique challenges to STJ. To this author's knowledge, there are
no reported cases involving the recognition of foreign judgments in Brazil
where the party against whom enforcement is being sought has put forth
extreme allegations similar to Chevron's against the Republic of Ecuador and
the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. In any case, STJ will still have to evaluate all the
facts in light of least two of the substantive requirements of Resolution Nine: to
wit, the alleged finality and res judicata effect (trdnsito em julgado) of the Lago
Agrio judgment, and its purported contravention to Brazil's public order.
Regarding the finality issue, as discussed previously, Ecuadorean law
allows the enforceability of a judgment upon its confirmation on appeal,
regardless of the pendency of an extraordinary review by the NCJE.188 The
only manner in which the losing party may prevent the enforceability during
that stage is by posting bond.1 89 In practical terms, such judgment precludes the
parties' relitigating the same issues and directs them to comply with the
decision in the same terms confirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such effect,
however, is conditional upon NCJE's further examination on extraordinary
appeal. 190 As a result, one could argue that the true finality and therefore the
res judicata effect of the judgment are only achieved after the NCJE decides the
Recurso de Casacidn, and the ruling becomes immutable. 191
188. See Cassation Act, art. 11 (Ecuador).
189. Id.
190. Id. at art. 16.
191. Id.
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Accepting the contrary could potentially create a difficult situation for the
parties, if the NCJE annulled the judgment. 192 In such a case, had the once-
losing party already complied with the judgment, the court would have to
ensure that she gets reimbursed and that the situation is reverted to the status
quo ex ante. In a case such as Lago Agrio, the complex nature of the
obligations imposed by the trial court in its judgment, and the significant sums
of money awarded to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs, would likely exacerbate such
difficulties. 193 The regime of judgment enforceability and res judicata in Brazil
is very similar to one adopted by Ecuador. As a matter of Brazilian law, the
filing of a request for extraordinary review by the highest court does not inhibit
the prevailing party from enforcing the judgment. 194 Furthermore, the only
manner in which the losing party may prevent enforcement during the
pendency of the extraordinary review is by posting bond. 195 With respect to the
res judicata (Cosa Julgada) effect under Brazilian law, it only occurs when no
more ordinary or extraordinary challenges are allowed against a judgment, thus
making it immutable and indisputable. 
196
A second issue to be considered by STJ under a Resolution Nine analysis is
whether the Lago Agrio judgment offends Brazil's public order. 197 It is
precisely under this rubric that Chevron has framed most of its allegations of
corruption, 198  professional misconduct,199  collusion,200  and political
interference 20 1 against the Republic of Ecuador and the Lago Agrio plaintiffs.
Although these arguments have become the centerpiece of Chevron's defense
against the Lago Agrio proceedings in several fora and also helped persuade the
members of the arbitral panel to issue several precautionary measures on
Chevron's behalf, the STJ may display reluctance to consider them as its main
192. See Recurso de Casaci6n, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., No. 17711-2012-0174 (Apr.
17, 2012).
193. See Chevron's Reply in Brazil, supra note 186, at 103.
194. See C.P.C. art. 497 (Brazil) ("0 recurso extraordindirio e o recurso especial nao
impedem a execu~do da senten~a; a interposi Ao do agravo de instrumento nAo obsta o
andamento do processo, ressalvado o disposto no art. 558 desta Lei.").
195. See C.P.C. art. 558 (Brazil) ("0 relator poderd, a requerimento do agravante, nos
casos de prisao civil, adiudica Ao, remi Ao de bens, levantamento de dinheiro sem cau Ao
id6nea e em outros casos dos quais possa resultar lesao grave e de dificil repara~do, sendo
relevante a fundamenta~do, suspender o cumprimento da decisdo at6 o pronunciamento
definitivo da turma ou caimara.").
196. See C.P.C. art. 467 (Brazil) ("Denomina-se coisa julgada material a eficfcia, que
torna imutivel e indiscutivel a sentenga, ndo mais sujeita a recurso ordindirio ou
extraordindirio.").
197. See STJ Resolution 9, art. 6.
198. See Chevron's Reply in Brazil, supra note 184, at 84 et seq.
199. Id. at 110.
200. Id. at 18.
201. Id. at 19, 120, 129.
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basis for a potential dismissal of the application to domesticate the Lago Agrio
judgment.
One of the possible obstacles that might prevent the STJ from embracing
Chevron's corruption argument rests on the fact that most of the alleged
irregularities took place prior to the Lago Agrio judgment in the course of
domestic judicial proceedings in Ecuador, and for which the parties could
obtain redress through the available local remedies. Although the allegations of
corruption are grave in nature, the STJ could find it very difficult to address
them without opining on the overall functioning of the legal and political
institutions of Ecuador. By opining on such arguments, the STJ could run the
risk of stepping into a difficult political squabble, and away from the limited
scope of review allowed by Resolution Nine.
Without having to opine on the politically charged allegations of corruption
and judicial malfunctioning in Ecuador, the STJ could look into the protection
of Brazil's public order by examining, for instance, the $8.6 billion punitive
202damages component of the Lago Agrio award. Punitive damages, although
permitted in the U.S. and other common law jurisdictions, are a sore point in
the development of civil litigation throughout Latin America,2 03 and Brazil is
no exception. 20 4 Furthermore, any court-awarded damages that are not meant to
directly compensate for an actual harm are deemed to be against Brazil's public
policy.20 5 On more than one occasion, Brazilian courts2 °6 and the STJ itself.
207
have overruled different attempts by local courts to award punitive or
exemplary damages, but have not delved into the specific question of whether
punitive damages are in direct violation of Brazil's public order.
The STJ has concluded that an offense to Brazil's public order would occur
when the foreign judgment which enforcement is sought in Brazil contains
provisions that go against fundamental principles of the Brazilian legal system
as expressly provided in the domestic laws of that country. 20 8 Such would be
the case of a foreign court judgment that carries the death penalty, or one that
upholds a same-sex marriage decree. Nonetheless, Brazilian courts have
recognized foreign judgments even when their legal basis is not explicitly
202. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra note 4, at 185.
203. See supra note 25.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 35.
206. See, e.g, Tribunal de Justiga de Sao Paulo [T.J.S.P.], Ap. Civ. corn Revis'o no.
479.713-4/8-00, 11.12.2008 (Brazil) (on file with author).
207. See, e.g., S.T.J., REsp No. 913131/BA, Didirio da Justiga [D.J.], 16.9.2008; S.T.J.
REsp No. 210101/PR; S.T.J. REsp No. 401.358/PB, Difrio da Justiga [D.J.], 5.3.2009; S.T.J.
REsp No. 748.868/RS, Relator: Min. Humberto Martins, 25.03.2009, Didirio do Judicidrio
Eletr6nico [D.J.e.], 06.04.2009.
208. See, e.g., Superior Tribunal de Justiga, SEC No. 5493, available at
http://www.stj.jus.br/webstj/processo.
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supported in Brazil, but only on foreign law principles. 20 9
The rationale for rejecting punitive damages in Brazil and other Latin
American countries rests on the fact that instead of compensating the victim for
an actual harm, the goal of punitive damages is to simply deter a future socially
undesirable conduct. 2 1 This is precisely what the Lago Agrio court intended to
do when it awarded such damages to the Lago Agrio plaintiffs, and conditioned
them to a public apology to be offered by Chevron within fifteen days after the
judgment became duly enforceable. 2 11 On a related note, and although it might
not be relevant in the context of the Brazilian recognition proceedings, Ecuador
does not allow punitive damages either.2 12 The decision of whether to admit the
punitive damages component of the Lago Agrio judgment or reject it under
public policy considerations is obviously an important one. One could argue
that if the STJ were to recognize the Lago Agrio award in its entirety, it would
likely put foreign and Brazilian litigants on unequal footing. The reason being
that while the parties to a domestic dispute could not obtain punitive damages
because of their lack of legal basis in Brazil, foreign parties could, on the other
hand, enforce a punitive damages award rendered by a foreign court. As a
result, private disputants would also be incentivized to circumvent the ban by
simply choosing to litigate outside of Brazil but would still be able to obtain
satisfaction in that country by domesticating any foreign judgment containing
exemplary damages.
Alternatively, the STJ could deny recognition to the punitive damages
component of the Lago Agrio judgment, and to any other section that it deemed
offensive to Brazil's public order, but still allow the remainder of the judgment
to be fulfilled in Brazil. This solution would be consistent with article 4(2) of
Resolution Nine, which expressly allows the partial domestication of foreign
judgments.2 13 Furthermore, in order to obtain the fulfillment of the damages
portion of the foreign judgment the requesting party would still have to follow
a summary proceeding in federal court, upon the STJ's granting of
recognition.2 14 In any case, the protection of Brazil's public order is also
ensured by the intervention of the Office of the Public Attorney (Minist6rio
Pdblico), whose representative is required to be notified of the proceedings so it
can participate on behalf of the general interest.
2 15
209. Id.
210. See G6mez, Rise of Class Actions. supra note 25, at 35.
211. See Lago Agrio Judgment, supra note 4, at 186.
212. See Chevron's Reply in Brazil, supra note 184, at 74.
213. See TSJ Resolution 9, supra note 177, at art. 4(2) ("As decis~es estrangeiras
podem ser homologadas parcialmente").
214. See Federal Constitution, art. 109, x (Brazil); TSJ Resolution 9, supra note 179,
art. 12.
215. See id. at art. 10 ("0 Ministdrio Piblico terdi vista dos autos nas cartas rogat6rias e
homologagses de sentengas estrangeiras, pelo prazo de dez dias, podendo impugndi-las.").
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As with every other instance of the Chevron-Ecuador saga, the actions
before the STJ are fiercely contested by both parties. Even a seemingly
straightforward proceeding such as the one leading to the recognition of the
Lago Agrio judgment can become utterly complicated and plagued with
hurdles. From the simplest administrative step, such as the issuance of the
summons and delivery of the letters rogatory to the foreign parties-which in
the present case took several months to complete-to the filing of memoranda
filing of hundreds of documents, 2 16 the recognition proceedings in Brazil will
not unfold quietly. Whereas the Lago Agrio plaintiffs' strategy is to reach into
the deep pockets of Chevron's multi-billion-dollar operation in Brazil, the other
side will continue to try blocking those efforts and debilitate the Lago Agrio
plaintiffs' capacity to continue fighting.
At the time of writing, Chevron requested that the STJ revoke the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs' authorization to litigate in forma pauperis.2 17 As the basis of
its petition, Chevron produced evidence obtained in the course of foreign
proceedings, which demonstrated the involvement of at least a dozen third-
party investors as financiers of the Lago Agrio plaintiffs.2 18 Chevron also
revealed evidence about hundreds of thousands of dollars already spent by the
Lago Agrio plaintiffs, and depicted them as exclusively driven by an appetite to
reap the potential windfall that would result from the enforcement of the Lago
Agrio judgment.
Even if the STJ decided to revoke the authorization given to the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs to litigate in forma pauperis, such decision would only have an
effect on the Brazilian proceedings. The Lago Agrio plaintiffs have long
enjoyed such a benefit in Ecuador, and were recently able to extend it to the
enforcement proceedings pending in Argentina. Although as noted earlier, the
Republic of Argentina is a party to both Montevideo Conventions, their
domestic regime for the domestication of foreign judgments is more
complicated than the one set forth by Resolution Nine in Brazil.
B. Attaching Chevron 's Assets in Argentina
In the case of Argentina, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment is subject to the laws of the province where the judgment is sought to
be enforced. Argentina is a federal state where each province has enacted their
216. To illustrate this point, Chevron's reply to the application to domesticate the Lago
Agrio judgment was accompanied by 157 documents. See Chevron's Reply in Brazil, supra
note 184, at 152.
217. See Request of Chevron Corporation Regarding Petitioners' Authorization to
Litigate in Forma Pauperis, Aguinda v. Chevron Corp., S.T.J., Pet. 8542, Relator: Min.
Andrighi (Sup. Trib. Justice, Mar. 13, 2013).
218. Id. at 10-12.
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own procedural rules, but which are nonetheless very similar in scope and
content. As a general rule, Argentine courts will grant recognition through a
special confirmation procedure known as exequatur. The statutory requirements
are more difficult to meet than those of Brazil, as the foreign judgment is
expressly required not to contradict any ruling previously entered by an
Argentine court.
Moreover, the Argentine exequatur proceedings also presuppose that the
court of the sending state had jurisdiction over all of the parties, that the foreign
judgment has produced res judicata effects, and that the action in the state of
origin was a personal action or an action concerning a movable asset which is
currently in the Argentine Republic. 2 19 Similar to Brazil's Resolution Nine,
Argentine courts are also required to ensure that the party against whom
enforcement is sought was notified of the proceedings and given an opportunity
to present her case, and also that the foreign judgment does not violate
Argentina's public order.
Given the relative complexity of the Argentine exequatur, and some of the
hurdles faced by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs when attempting to obtain the
recognition of the Lago Agrio judgment in Canada and Brazil, the plaintiffs
switched their strategy for Argentina. Instead of seeking the enforcement of the
Lago Agrio judgment, Argentine counsel chose instead to seek the fulfillment
of the precautionary attachment decreed by the Provincial Court of Justice of
Sucumbios in October of 2012. Such precautionary attachment not only
covered Chevron's assets in Ecuador but all over the world, so its practical
effect would be similar to securing Chevron's assets pursuant to the Lago Agrio
judgment. 2 20 In its decree, the Sucumbios Court transcribed all the names of
the companies listed by Chevron as subsidiaries in the 10K form filed with the
SEC in 2011. 22 1 Such a comprehensive list included more than seventy
companies located in every continent, and naturally some headquartered in
Argentina.
222
By choosing to enforce a precautionary measure instead of the final
judgment on the merits, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs were able to avoid some of
the difficulties that might arise from the stricter scrutiny to which final
judgments are subject, and perhaps reduce Chevron's maneuvering space. In
more concrete terms, the controlling treaty, which is the Preventive Measures
219. This is particularly important because it prevents Argentina from becoming what I
have called a "layover jurisdiction," a jurisdiction where the parties are not intending to
actually enforce the foreign judgment, but simply use it as a vehicle to get to a third country
where the enforcement will take place.
220. See Sucumbios Attachment Order, supra note 109 at 1.
221. Id.
222. Id.
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Convention mentioned earlier,22 3 makes it more difficult for the enforcing court
to reject the foreign order on public policy grounds. The standard set forth in
the Preventive Measures Convention refers to acts "manifestly contrary to the
public policy (public order)" of the enforcing state, 224 instead of the broader
and arguably lower threshold set forth in Argentina's internal exequatur rules
that allows the enforcing court to reject a petition that "does not affect the
principles of Argentina's public order.
' 225
The enforcement of a precautionary measure such as the one granted by the
Sucumbios Court also prevents Chevron from raising any possible defenses
regarding the presumed illegality of the punitive damages award. The
attachment order simply mentioned the total amount to be seized, instead of
itemizing the different components of the judgment, 226 thus foreclosing any
possibility for the Argentine court to scrutinize any of the Ecuadorean acts
beyond the simple text of the attachment order, and for Chevron to challenge it.
Another advantage of enforcing an attachment order instead of a final judgment
rests on the ex parte nature of the former,227 and the expediency with which the
enforcing court is allowed to act.228 The attachment order did not clarify that
the Sucumbios Court had already issued an enforceable judgment.
The file submitted to the Argentine judge simply contained a request for
judicial cooperation as if the Ecuadorean action was still pending, and that is
exactly how the Argentine Court understood it to be. To the Argentine judge
the task was simple. When she received a request from an Ecuadorean court to
assist them in the execution of a precautionary measure decreed in the context
of an ongoing litigation, the Argentine judge reviewed it and accepted it, thus
reportedly freezing approximately $2 billion of Chevron's assets in the South
American nation.229 Chevron later challenged it, the Court of Appeals
confirmed the attachment, and Chevron further requested the Argentine
Supreme Court to overturn it.
On June 4, 2013, in a six-to-one vote the Argentine Supreme Court lifted
the attachment and dismissed the petition to enforce. 230 The Court noted that
223. See Preventive Measures Convention supra note 168
224. Id. art. 12.
225. See CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION rCOD. PROC. CIV. Y
COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 517(4) (Argentina) ("Que la
sentencia no afecte los principios de orden pfiblico del derecho argentino").
226. See Sucumbios Attachment Order, supra note 111 at 1.
227. See CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL Y COMERCIAL DE LA NACION [COD. PROC. CIv. Y
COM.] [CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 198 (Argentina).
228. Id. at art. 214.
229. Emily Schmall, Argentina: Chevron's Assets Are Frozen, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7,
2012, at A9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/world/americas/argentina-
chevrons-assets-are- frozen.html? r-0.
230. See Argentine Supreme Court Ruling, supra note 8.
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Chevron Argentina S.R.L., Ingeniero Roberto Prifi S.R.L., CDC Aps, and
CDHC Aps were separate entities from Chevron Corporation, and therefore not
parties to the Ecuadorean litigation.23 1 The only way to allow the enforcement
against those entities, the Court concluded, would have been after "conducting
an adversarial proceeding, either principal or collateral, that effectively
provides the parties an opportunity to make their case", 232 which obviously did
not occur. A different conclusion, the Court said would violate Argentine
international public policy's set forth in articles 17 and 18 of the
Constitution.
233
Even if the Argentine proceedings were successful, carrying out a
precautionary measure would not have guaranteed the recognition or
enforcement of the final decision on the merits rendered by the Sucumbios
court.2 34 The Lago Agrio plaintiffs' strategy in Argentina was perhaps just to
execute the attachment order as a way to gain leverage and force Chevron to
negotiate, which in light of the recent Argentine Supreme Court ruling it is
obviously out of the question. As with the proceedings pending in Brazil, and
the potential of more enforcement requests to be filed in other jurisdictions,
there is no end in sight for this saga. Meanwhile, the parties will likely continue
to race each other in different countries in an attempt to reach their strategic
goals, or at the very least to prevent their opponent from reaching theirs first.
CONCLUSION
Metaphorically speaking, the Chevron-Ecuador saga could be characterized
as the judicial version of a Hydra, the mythical monster with the body of a
serpent and many heads that could never be harmed and whose severed heads
would grow back endless times.23 5 Despite the absolute determination of the
parties and their counsel, the vast resources devoted to the litigation, and the
endless maneuvering on both sides, the Chevron case resists going away. What
began as a relatively straightforward legal dispute confined to the courts of one
or two countries has evolved into a multi-jurisdictional nightmare of global
proportions that becomes more complex and difficult every week. When the
Sucumbios Court handed down its decision two years ago ordering Chevron to
pay $18 billion in damages, the plaintiffs might have thought that their victory
was sealed, but reality showed otherwise.
The frequent twists and turns that occur almost simultaneously in the
judicial proceedings that are pending in the courts of at least five different
231. Id. at4 7.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See Preventive Measures Convention art. 6.
235. See JULIE STANTON, MYTHOLOGY: MYTHS, LEGENDS AND FANTASIES 128 (2006).
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countries reveal that the parties' actions have never followed a carefully
planned script, or a pre-arranged strategy, but rather an instinctive reaction to
their opponent's previous move. The fact that the main piece of the Chevron-
Ecuador litigation has taken place in South America, and that the majority of
the enforcement actions are also occurring in that region, is particularly
important. In the recent decade, several South American countries, including
Brazil and Argentina, have enacted important changes in order to modernize
their civil litigation regimes.
One of the main transformations taking place in the region has been
precisely the expansion in the protection of collective rights, and the
establishment of different forms of collective litigation including class actions.
As a result, the policy debate at both national and regional levels has also
broadened to include themes that were traditionally absent from the regional
discourse, such as whether punitive damages should be allowed, the regulation
of third party finance, and the interplay between international arbitration and
domestic litigation. Coincidentally, all of these themes are central to the
Chevron-Ecuador saga. The parties' efforts to obtain the recognition and
enforcement of the Lago Agrio judgment in Brazil and Argentina has definitely
rekindled that debate, and will likely test the local courts' ability to cope with
the new demands of transnational litigation. On the other hand, by focusing on
the proceedings that are pending on those countries, this Article contributes to
expanding the scholarly discussion on the lessons arising from the Chevron-
Ecuador dispute beyond the U.S. into South America, which is precisely where
this unique legal battle is taking place.
With regard to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, this
Article has shown that despite several significant efforts undertaken at the
regional level to harmonize the domestication of foreign judgments, the
effective application of those rules still depends on the interpretation of the
local courts, which is in turn shaped by national public policy considerations.
The presence of very powerful well-funded parties, such as the ones involved
in the Lago Agrio dispute, the gravity of the allegations involving their
conduct, and their ability to engage armies of lawyers ready to wage
simultaneous court battles in different jurisdictions, has also placed pressure on
the judges to look beyond the confines of the court docket to deliver justice and
seek the truth.
The intricate chain of events that surrounded the judicial proceedings
leading to the Lago Agrio judgment, and the multiple allegations of corruption
and undue influence that are said to have tainted the process, pose a difficult
dilemma to the enforcing judges. On the one hand, they may choose to apply a
formalistic and narrow interpretation of their own recognition standard, and
confine their assessment to the four comers of the foreign judgment, thus
leaving aside the corruption defense. On the other hand, the enforcing judges
may decide not to turn a blind eye to the grave allegations of corruption raised
by Chevron, and weigh those facts in their decision whether to enforce the
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foreign judgment. In any case, their decision will be influenced by an array of
external factors of political, economic, and social nature, and by the
maneuvering of the parties.
All these intricacies are precisely what make the Chevron-Ecuador saga an
ideal case for the scholarly exploration of the multilayered reality of modem
complex litigation. While this Article only scratched the surface of the multi-
step process of enforcing a foreign judgment in South America, it has
nonetheless contributed by describing the incentives and challenges faced by
the parties, procedural and otherwise, in their effort to obtain justice in such a
convoluted world.
